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Richard Haygood1
I. INTRODUCTION
Concerns over the reach of Big Tech2 have been
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2 “Big Tech refers to the major technology companies such as Apple,
Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Microsoft, which have inordinate
1
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growing for a number of years. The latter half of President
Trump’s tenure in office, in particular, drew worldwide
attention as controversies between censorship, freedom of
speech, and big tech blossomed. Amazon has built a
surveillance network that allows police to monitor and obtain
recordings taken by Ring doorbells and home networks.3 Big
Tech is often accused of learning and cataloging everything
about an individual, including where they live, where they
work, what they eat, who they socialize with, and their dayto-day routines—and then selling it off for profit and
advertising.4 Doomsayers preach of a dystopian world where
Big Tech sells entire lives in "behavior futures markets."5
And, if Cambridge Analytica's actions in 2018 and their
attempts to influence the Presidential election are any proof,

influence.” BIG TECH, https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/
term/big-tech (last visited July 15, 2021).
3 Lauren Bridges, Amazon’s Ring is the Latest Civilian
Surveillance Network the US Has Ever Seen, THE GUARDIAN (Mar.
18, 2021, 8:51 EST),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/may/18/amazo
n-ring-largest-civilian-surveillance-network-us.
4 Rinat Abitov, The Dangers of Big Tech Companies and Data
Collection, LINKEDIN (Mar. 19, 2021),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/dangers-big-tech-companies-datacollection-rinat-abitov.
5 See Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The
Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power (2019),
https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=56791.
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those naysayers may be right.6
The halls of Congress have been far from silent, yet
the wheels of change are often slow in turning even with
bipartisan support, and legislation addressing perceived
concerns has not been forthcoming. Congress has, for
example, started considering making some changes to
antitrust laws that would target Big Tech.7 The proposed
measures would make it harder for the significant, marketdominating companies to make additional acquisitions and
lower the bar for challenging anti-competitive conduct, 8 yet
these measures only address a small portion of the problem.

6 Cambridge

Analytica was a British data-analytics consulting firm
that admitted to improperly obtaining the data of over 87 million
Facebook users in 2018. It then used that data to influence the
Presidential election. See Alexandra Ma and Ben Gilbert, Facebook
Understood How Dangerous the Trump-linked data firm
Cambridge Analytica Could Be Much Earlier than It Previously
Said. Here’s Everything That’s Happened Up Until Now, INSIDER
(Aug
23,
2019,
3:30
PM),
https://www.
businessinsider.com/cambridge-analytica-a-guide-to-the-trumplinked-data-firm-that-harvested-50-million-facebook-profiles2018-3; See also Alex Hern, Cambridge Analytica: How Did it Turn
Clicks Into Votes?, THE GUARDIAN (May 6, 2018, 3:00 EST),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/may/06/cambridgeanalytica-how-turn-clicks-into-votes-christopher-wylie.
7 Brent Kendall and Ryan Tracy, Congress Eyes Antitrust Changes
to Counter Big Tech, Consolidation, WALL ST. J. (MAR. 11, 2021,
2:18 PM EST), https://www.wsj.com/articles/congress-eyesantitrust-changes-to-counter-big-tech-consolidation11615458603?mod=article_inline.
8 Id.
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While these measures may help foster competition—if they
are ever actually enacted—anti-trust legislation primarily
protects the public from monopolies and restraints on trade.9
In other words, they do little to abate the worries of the
average citizen regarding predominant concerns over the
corporate expansion of these already powerful Big Tech
firms. In the absence of congressional action, a few states
have proposed a number of regulations aimed at protecting
consumer privacy.10 Amongst these are restrictions that
would seek to limit the reach of Big Tech on issues ranging
from

online

privacy

to

digital

advertisements.11

Nevertheless, without the backing of Congress, these laws
are naturally limited in scope and feasibility.
Despite growing concerns, there have been very few
legal challenges to tech companies' power over online
speech,12 and even fewer that have been successful. The

Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp 899, 903
(D. Md. 1956).
10 Sebastian Herrera and Dan Frosch, Why the Next Big-Tech
Fights Are in State Capitals, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2021, 2:42 PM
EST), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-the-next-big-tech-fightsare-in-state-capitals-11615714201.
11 Id.
12 Ahiza García-Hodges, Big Tech Has Big Power Over Online
Speech. Should it be Reined In?, NBCNEWS (Jan 21. 2021, 12:00
PM EST), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/big-tech-hasbig-power-over-online-speech-should-it-n1255164.
9
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dearth of cases is attributable, at least in part, to the current
legal framework13 and the lack of a successful methodology
available to challenge these tech industry giants. Claims
filed under existing anti-trust laws are amongst the leading
challenges to Big Tech, but those are necessarily limited by
their design to address a few specific issues.14 All other
potential claims, particularly those reflecting harm to
individual liberties, lack a vehicle capable of bringing the
judicial claims necessary to restrain Big Tech overreach.
Many plaintiffs have tried using the state action doctrine as
a means of inhibiting these companies, yet the doctrine is
inherently flawed and has been so limited by the Court that
its judicial inadequacies cannot be overcome.
This paper proceeds in three sections. First, I outline
the traditional cases that serve as the structural basis for the
state action doctrine, paying specific attention to the
judicially imposed constraints and limitations. Then, in the
second section, I demonstrate through recent case law how
those same constraints and limitations prevent the doctrine

13
14

Id.
See Schwing supra note 9.
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from being applied in the digital age to preserve personal
liberty from Big Tech overreach. Third, I propose a solution
in the form of an administrative remedy and a revival of the
bygone fairness doctrine.

II. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
A. PURPOSE
The state action doctrine is derived from the Civil
Rights Cases and is predicated upon the distinction between
private and government action.15 This doctrine serves as a
tool to determine when private actions can be regulated by
the same principles as state action.16 It is a tool designed to
address the "essential dichotomy between deprivation by the

United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) ("[C]ivil rights,
such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against State
aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals,
unsupported by State authority laws, customs, or judicial or
executive proceedings. The wrongful act of an individual,
unsupported by any such authority, is simply a private wrong, or a
crime of that individual . . . but if not sanctioned in some way by
the State, or not done under State authority, his rights remain in
full force, and [he] may presumably be vindicated by resort to the
laws of the State for redress. An individual cannot deprive a man
of his right[s].").
16 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (“[The Fourteenth]
Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct,
however discriminatory or wrongful.”); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) (“As a matter of substantive
constitutional law the state-action requirement reflects judicial
recognition of the fact that ‘most rights secured by the Constitution
are protected only against infringement by governments’” (quoting
Flagg Bros., v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978)).
15
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state, subject to scrutiny under its provisions, and private"17
action "however discriminatory or wrongful."18 Although
there is not "any set of circumstances absolutely sufficient,"19
the courts have applied the doctrine in several different
scenarios, arguably inconsistently,20 recognizing that "there
may be some countervailing reason against attributing
activity to the government."21
Broadly, the courts apply the state action doctrine via
either what is known as the public functions test or the
entanglement test. More specifically, the courts seem to have
carved out several machinations through which private
conduct can be transformed into state action: (1) the public

Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 348 (1974).
Id. (quoting Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13).
19 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Ath. Assoc., 531 U.S.
288, 295 (2001) (citing Nat'l Collegiate Ath. Assoc. v. Tarkanian,
488 U.S. 179, 193, 196 (1988)).
20 See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (the “twoprong” test); See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157
(1978) (the "joint action” test); See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (the “nexus” test); See Adickes v. S.
H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 150, 170 (1970) (the “state compulsion”
test); See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (the “public function”
test); See also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (the “public
function" test); See also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U.S. 715 (1961) (the “nexus” test).
21 Brentwood, supra note 19, at 295. ("What is fairly attributable is
a matter of normative judgment, and the criteria lack rigid
simplicity. [N]o one fact can function as a necessary condition
across the board for finding state action; nor is any set of
circumstances absolutely sufficient.")
17
18
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functions doctrine, which equates a private entity that
performs a function that has been traditionally, exclusively
reserved to the state to state action; (2) the entwinement
doctrine, when there is joint activity between a private entity
and a state or state actor; (3) when the state either expressly
or implicitly endorses private conduct; and (4) when there
has been

judicial

enforcement of

some harmful or

discriminatory private conduct. The courts regard each
inquiry as fact-specific to the case and governed by
underlying public policy principles.22

B. THE TESTS
1. PUBLIC FUNCTIONS TEST
The first approach is the most commonly used in
attempts to limit the reach of Big Tech. It attempts to equate
private conduct to state action when a private party or entity
performs some function or commits some act traditionally
and exclusively reserved to the state.23 Although this
doctrine may have fallen into disfavor by the present-day
courts, the doctrine has been successfully applied in cases

22
23

See Lugar, supra note 16.
See Jackson, supra note 17 at 352.
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involving company towns,24 elections,25 and municipal
parks.26
Marsh v. Alabama is one of the first instances where
the Court applied this test, and it is still one of the leading
cases on the application of the theory.27 In Marsh, a
Jehovah's Witness was arrested and charged with criminal
trespass after seeking to distribute religious literature on a
sidewalk28 in Chickasaw, a suburb of Mobile, Alabama.29
Chickasaw was a "company town" that the Gulf Shipbuilding
Corporation wholly owned.30 The Court found it to be
identical to any other residential town except that the
corporation paid the deputy,31 merchants rented stores from
the company rather than owning them, and the company
owned the streets and sidewalks.32 Despite the town's
privately-owned nature, the Court stated that there was
"nothing to stop highway traffic from coming onto the

Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Smith v. Allwright, 329
U.S. 649 (1944); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
26 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
27 Marsh, supra note 24, at 506.
28 Id. at 503-4.
29 Id. at 502.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 503.
24
25
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business block and [making] free use of the facilities
available there."33 As a result, the Court concluded that "the
town and its shopping district [were] accessible to and freely
used by the public in general and there [was] nothing to
distinguish them from any other town and shopping center
except the fact that the title to the property belongs to a
private corporation."34 By taking on the form of a traditional
municipality and taking on the wide range of associated
municipal powers, the company-owned town had thus
assumed the state's traditional role.35
The courts have also used the public function doctrine
in election-related cases, often to ameliorate perceived social
injustice. The case of Smith v. Allwright36 was an instance
concerning the Democratic Party's “[p]rimary elections
[which were] conducted by the party under state statutory
authority.”37

There,

the

Democratic

Party

restricted

membership to “all white citizens of the State of Texas who
are qualified to vote under the Constitution and laws of the

Id.
Id.
35 Id.
36 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
37 Id. at 663.
33
34
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State.”38 The Court equated the primary election process to
a traditional government function, stating that “[w]hen
primaries become a part of the machinery for choosing
officials . . . the same tests to determine the character of
discrimination or abridgment should be applied to the
primary as are applied to the general election.”

39

Thus, “[i]f

the State requires a certain electoral procedure, prescribes a
general election ballot made up of party nominees so chosen
and limits the choice of the electorate in general elections for
state offices . . . it endorses, adopts and enforces the
discrimination” of the private party. 40
The Court also reached a similar conclusion in Terry
v. Adams,41 concluding that an association’s chief objective
was “to deny Negros any voice or part in the election.”42
Because the majority of voters in that district generally
abided by and supported the candidates elected in the
association’s primary,43 the association had become an

Id. at 657.
Id. at 664.
40 Id.
41 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
42 Id. at 465.
43 Id.
38
39
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integral part of the election process, a traditional state
function. The two cases’ conclusion is clear: any attempted
interference with the election machinery that controls access
to ballots is the equivalent of a private group performing a
traditional state function and will be regulated as such.

i. RETRACTION AND LIMITATIONS
a. STRICT LIMITATIONS WHEN AFFECTING
PRIVATE PROPERTY
Although the Court seemed to have found a use for
the public functions test and briefly expanded it, 44 the
doctrine was quickly whittled down and its scope narrowed
over the next decade. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,45 the Court
distinguished previous cases of Marsh and Logan Valley,
specifically noting several key limitations to the public
functions test, especially regarding the intersection of
personal liberties and private property. First, integral to the
decision in Marsh was that the company town was

See Amalgamated Food Emps. Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391
U.S. 308, 318 (1968) (where the Court briefly expanded the public
function test. Citing to Marsh, the Court found that the shopping
mall where an individual sought to distribute material was the
“functional equivalent” business plaza in Marsh and thus subject
to the constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment).
45 Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
44
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“performing the full spectrum of municipal powers and stood
in the shoes of the State.” 46 Second, it stated that “property
[does not] lose its private character merely because the
public is generally invited to use it for designated
purposes.”47 In other words, requiring property rights to give
way “to the exercise of First Amendment rights under
circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of
communication exist . . . would diminish property rights
without significantly enhancing the asserted right of free
speech.”48

b. THE TRADITIONALLY EXCLUSIVE REQUIREMENT
Courts consistently hold that a private party must be
performing an action that has been traditionally performed
by the states, yet their holdings have been elusive—perhaps
purposefully so—in what a traditional state function is.49
The Court has emphasized that “very few” actions or
functions will ever fall into this category.

Id. at 569.
Id.
48 Id. at 567.
49 Flagg Bros., Inc. supra note 16, at 158.
50 Id.
46
47

50

In Jackson v.
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Metropolitan Edison Co., the Court attempted to clarify what
it meant by functions and powers traditionally reserved to
the states.51 In doing so, the Court sharpened the lines
between a public function and a public good, further limiting
the state action doctrine’s application.52 In that case, Jackson
sued a privately owned and operated utility company,
alleging that “Metropolitan’s termination of her service . . .
constituted ‘state action’ depriving her of property in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s” due process
clause.53 Jackson argued that because Metropolitan was a
heavily regulated entity by the Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission, retained monopoly status,54 and provided
electricity as an essential public service,55 the termination of
her services without notice and an opportunity for a hearing
was improper.56
Although the Court conceded that “something of a
governmentally protected monopoly will more readily be
found to be state acts than will the acts of an entity lacking

Jackson, supra note 17, at 349.
Id. at 358-9.
53 Id. at 346.
54 Id. at 351-2.
55 Id. at 352.
56 Id.
51
52
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these characteristics,”57 it ultimately held that “there [must
be] a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the
challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of
the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” 58
Thus, although the provision of electricity and other utilities
was a public good, it wasn’t a function traditionally within
the realm of state powers. Further, in forming its decision,
the Court explicitly recognized that private performance “of
powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State” was
necessary to implicate the Fourteenth Amendment.59 In
doing so, the Court specifically cited previous cases decided
under the public function test, further limiting the doctrine
to the performance of actions not performed by both the state
and any other private entity.60
The Court in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn61 further clarified
the doctrine, holding that a privately owned operation
funded by the government and for-public benefit was
insufficient to invoke the state action doctrine. The Court

Id. at 349.
Id.
59 Id. at 352.
60 Id. at 357-58.
61 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
57
58
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conceded that “the education of maladjusted high school
students [was] a public function”62 but continued its analysis
to state that this was “only the beginning of the inquiry”63
and “that until recently the State had not undertaken to
provide education for students who could not be served by
traditional public schools.” Rather, while educating special
needs children was a function of the state, it wasn’t a
traditionally exclusive function. The Court predicated a
similar holding in Blum v. Yaretsky,64 a case decided on the
same day as Rendell-Baker,65 on the case of Polk v. Dodson,
which questioned whether a public defender was acting as
an agent of the state when representing an indigent criminal
defendant.66 The Court in Polk stated that the public
defender’s “assignment entailed functions and obligations
[that were] in no way dependent on state authority.”67 As a
result, Blum concluded that nursing homes did not perform
a traditionally exclusively reserved function to the states.68

2. ENTWINEMENT TEST
Id. at 842.
Id.
64 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
65 The Court decided both decisions on June 25, 1982.
66 Rendell-Baker, supra note 61, at 1009.
67 Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981).
68 Blum, supra note 64 at 1011.
62
63
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The second category of actions that the courts have
found to create state action is when a private party and a
state jointly deprive a third party of his constitutional rights.
In such a situation, a court generally looks to the nature and
extent of the relationship between the private party and the
state. Generally speaking, this leaves two distinct situations.
The first occurs when a state actor is directly involved in
depriving constitutional rights.69 The second occurs when a
state and private party enter a mutually beneficial
relationship—a “symbiotic relationship”—and the private
party takes an action that transmutes into state action due
to the relationship.70
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.71 is a classic example of
when a state actor becomes involved with a private entity in

See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1967) (holding that the
involvement of a state official in a conspiracy to deprive another of
their constitutional rights provides the state action necessary to
show a direct violation of equal protection rights regardless of
whether the actions were either lawful or official); see also United
States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966) (“To act ‘under color’ of
law does not require that the accused be an officer of the State. It
is enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity with the
State or its agents.”).
70 See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715
(1961).
71 Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
69
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denying a third-party a constitutional right. In that case, it
was alleged that a Kress employee and a Hattiesburg police
officer acted together to deny an individual access to the
Kress store because she “was a white person in the presence
of Negroes.”72 In remanding the case for a new trial, the
Court held that such joint participation between a state
official and a private individual in a conspiracy to
discriminate against a third party racially was sufficient “to
show

a

direct

violation

of

petitioner's

Fourteenth

Amendment equal protection rights."73 Additionally, the
Court found a violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights
when state statutes or municipal participation fostered
discrimination, at least in part.74 In Smith v. Allwright, the
state statute did not mandate discriminatory exclusion of
blacks from voting in a party primary.75 Still, the statute did
prescribe that the nominees chosen in the primary create the
general ballot.76 And when the discriminatory terms of a will
precluded blacks from enjoying a municipal park in Evans v.

Id. at 152.
Id.
74 See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944); see also Evans
v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301-2 (1966).
75 See id. at 664.
76 Id.
72
73
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Newton, the Court held that the city’s involvement in
maintaining the park was sufficient to implicate state
involvement.77

i. LIMITATIONS
a. THE NEED FOR A SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP
State action can exist when a state and a private
entity enter into a mutually beneficial relationship, and the
private party acts in a way that violates a third party's
constitutional rights. The best example of this may still be
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.78 In that case, the
Court held that a relationship between a city-owned parking
garage and a privately owned restaurant that maintained a
lease with the parking garage was sufficient to impute the
discriminatory acts by the restaurant onto the state.79 The
restaurant itself was located within the garage, which was
owned and operated by the Wilmington Parking Authority,80
and “constituted at physically and financially integral and .

Evans supra note 26, at 301-2.
Burton, supra note 70.
79 Id. at 724.
80 Id. at 716.
77
78
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. . indispensable part of the State’s plan to operate as a selfsustaining unit.”81 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the
mutually conferred benefits82 “together with the obvious fact
that the restaurant is operated as an integral part of a public
building devoted to a public parking service, indicates that
degree

of

state

participation

and

involvement

in

discriminatory action which it was the design of the
Fourteenth Amendment to condemn.” 83
The Court has since limited the entwinement doctrine
and stated that the facts in Burton were dependent on the
symbiotic relationship created between the public parking
garage and the private restaurant.84 Specifically, the Court
stressed that the public parking garage was dependent on
the restaurant to recoup its investment in as much as the
restaurant was the parking garage for accessible parking

Id. at 724.
See id. at 715. (The land and building were publicly owned, and
the building was dedicated to public uses in the performance of
essential government functions by statute. The public was
responsible for the original purchase of the land, the building’s
construction, and the cost of maintenance on the building, and the
money made from renting space and parking were to be used to
repay the initial cost to the city. Restaurant guests were given
convenient parking and easy access to the restaurant. No
improvements on the building could be assessed for additional
taxes because the building itself was exempted tax-free by the city.)
83 Id. at 724.
84 See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972).
81
82
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and tax-free advantages.85 In contrast, in Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, the Court held that a privately owned building
on privately owned land without any public access could not
be transmuted by applying a state statute or regulation, even
if it partially controls the private party’s performance.86
Accordingly, while unconstitutional, discriminatory acts
must not necessarily originate from the state, state action
which actively encourages or endorses otherwise illegal
private conduct will be sufficient to impute state action87 so
long as the state has “significantly involved itself with
invidious discriminations.”88 Thus, “a State normally can be
held responsible for a private decision only when it has
exercised coercive power or has provided such significant
encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must
in law be deemed to be that of the State.”89

b. LEGISLATION AND FUNDING ALONE IS
INSUFFICIENT

Id.
Id.
87 Id. at 173.
88 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967).
89 Blum, supra note 64, at 1004.
85
86
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In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,

90

public funds accounted

for at least ninety and up to ninety-nine percent of a private
school’s operating budget during one year.91 In addition,
Boston and Brookline directly regulated the school92 and
required

it

to

comply

with

numerous

regulations,

particularly record-keeping functions.93 However, the Court
clearly stated that “legislative policy choice in no way makes
these services the exclusive province of the State.”94 The
Court echoed this sentiment, exemplifying its intent to
construe the doctrine narrowly in Blum v. Yaretsky.95 There,
the Court held that receiving state funding by a privately
owned nursing home,96 paying over ninety percent of the
patients’ medical expenses,97 and a state requirement to
complete patient care assessment forms98 was insufficient to
transmute the private action into state action. At the core of
the Court’s holding was that the nursing home wasn’t
required to rely on the assessment form when discharging or

Rendell-Baker, supra note 61.
Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Blum v. Yaretsky, supra note 64.
96 Id. at 1011.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1008.
90
91
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transferring patients99 or in any way implicate State
responsibility for those decisions. 100 Instead, the Court
reasoned that it was the human aspect: the doctors made
informed medical judgments according to professional
standards not governed by the state, which were responsible
for the discharges.101 The Court summarized this restriction
by bluntly stating that “the mere fact that a business is
subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action
into that of the State.”102

III. BIG TECH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND THE
FAILURE OF THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
A. INTRODUCTION
The concept of freedom of speech with the realm of
Big Tech has been a social and political hot topic for many
years, yet it has only recently come to the forefront of
discussion. This recent discussion is due in no small part to
the major impact these companies have on our daily lives.
The result as of late has generally been a bevy of

Id.
Id.
101 Id.
102 Jackson, supra note 17, at 350.
99

100

200
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conservative voices crying out that liberal-loving Big Tech
has unduly conspired to silence and suppress any politically
oppositional point of view.
In particular, social media platforms are a significant
and growing contributor to how both individuals and
companies interact with one another. While only five percent
of American adults used social media in 2005, that number
has grown by over fourteen times since then.103 As many as
seven out of ten Americans104 and more than 4.33 billion
people worldwide105 use social media platforms to access
news, entertainment, and communication. Google-owned
YouTube is currently crowned king of social media, with a
reported 81% of American adults visiting the site daily.106
The platform boasts an excess of 2 billion users107 in over 100

Social Media Fact Sheet, PEWRESEARCH (April 7, 2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/social-media/.
104 Id.
105 Global Social Media Stats, DATAREPORTAL,
https://datareportal.com/social-media-users (last visited July 15,
2021).
106 Social Media Use in 2021, PEWRESEARCH (APRIL 7, 2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/04/07/social-mediause-in-2021/. (last visited July 15, 2021).
107
See ABOUT YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/intl/enGB/about/press/#:~:text=Global%20Reach,in%20more%20than%2
0100%20countries (last visited July 15, 2021) (reporting 2+ billion
users); Maryam Mohsin, 10 YouTube Stats Every Marketer Should
Know in 2021, OBERLO (Jan. 25, 2021),
103
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countries and 80 different languages.108 It is visited by more
than 30 million visitors daily, and more than 400 hours of
videos are uploaded every hour.109 More content has been
uploaded to YouTube than has been produced by major U.S.
television networks; the company reports that over 1 billion
hours of video are watched on its site every day.110
After President Trump banned naysayers and
dissenters from viewing his Twitter account in 2018, claims
emerged which alleged that his actions had curtailed
freedom of speech and lacked the authority as a government
actor to limit who heard his message.111 More recently, in
what has been called a “coordinated crackdown on freedom
of speech,”112 social media platforms began closing down and

https://www.oberlo.com/blog/youtube-statistics (last visited July
15, 2021) (reporting 2.3 billion user worldwide); Prager Univ. v.
Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 2020) (“more than 1.3
billion users”).
108
See ABOUT YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/intl/enGB/about/press/#:~:text=Global%20Reach,in%20more%20than%2
0100%20countries (last visited July 15, 2021) (reporting 2+ billion
users).
109 Prager Univ., supra note 107, at 995.
110 Id.
111 See Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928
F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019).
112 Bradford Littlejohn, Big Tech and the Battle for Republican
Liberty, PUBLIC DISCOURSE (July 15, 2021),
https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2021/07/76774/.
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suspending users’ accounts, finding them in violation of their
terms of service following the capital riots in late 2020.113
During this “crackdown,” Twitter suspended over 70,000
accounts,114 and Facebook also removed an undisclosed
number. Facebook briefly banned President Trump115 in
January, and the platform announced in June of 2021 that
the suspension would last at least two years.116 By then,
Twitter had permanently banned President Trump from its
platform in January 2021.117
Challenges to Big Tech under the First Amendment
have been predictably limited. The First Amendment
guarantees that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging

Id.
Ellen Nakashima, et. al, Purges Force Extremists Off Social
Media Sites. That Can Complicate Investigators’ Work.
WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 17, 2021, 8:51 PM EST),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/far-rightinvestigations-encrypted-fbi/2021/01/17/bd7a71ac-580a-11eba931-5b162d0d033d_story.html.
115 Andrea Chang, Trump Returns to Twitter After Facebook
Extends Ban Through Inauguration, LA TIMES (Jan. 7, 2021, 7:21
AM
EST),
https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2021-0107/facebook-suspends-trump-account.
116 Mike Isaac and Sheera Frenkel. Facebook Says Trump’s Ban
Will Last at Least 2 Years, NY TIMES (June 7, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/04/technology/facebook-trumpban.html.
117 Kate Conger and Mike Isaac, Twitter Permanently Bans Trump,
Capping Online Revolt, NY TIMES (Jan. 12, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/08/technology/twitter-trumpsuspended.html.
113
114
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the freedom of speech”118 and provides a broad blanket of
protection for various types of expression. Although the First
Amendment’s constraints were originally only applicable to
the federal government, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause later applied the phrase to state governments
as well.119 Integral to this are the concepts that the
Constitution and its limitations only apply to governmental
actors and actions attributable to the government or a
government actor,120 and the amendment protects only
private actors.121 Indeed, the Court has stated explicitly that
“[t]he constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee
only against abridgment by government, federal or state." 122
Prima facie, the state action doctrine appears to be
the perfect vehicle for would-be plaintiffs to bridge the gap
between Big Tech platforms and the constraints imposed by
the First Amendment. However, attempts to utilize the

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (applying the First
Amendment to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment).
120 Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. UNIV. L.
REV. 503, 507 (1985); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976)
("the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only
against abridgment by government, federal or state").
121 Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S.Ct. 1921
(2019).
122 Hudgens v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976).
118
119
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doctrine have fallen short in a predictable pattern.123
Ultimately, the ambiguity left behind by the Court in the
public functions test applications, along with the limitations
imposed in its application, have made that avenue a nonstarter when it comes to preserving the freedom of speech
from the chilling effect of censorship in Big Tech. Routinely,
the Court has refused to find any government function.

B. THE TRADITIONAL PROBLEMATIC BARRIERS PERSIST
1. NO TRADITIONALLY EXCLUSIVE GOVERNMENT
FUNCTION EXISTS, ESPECIALLY IN THE DIGITAL
WORLD
The traditional line of cases following Lloyd Corp. has
made it clear that the precedent set in Marsh was to be
viewed as an anomaly predicated upon the pervasive control

See, e.g., Shulman v. Facebook.com, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
183110, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 2017) (Facebook is not a state actor);
Forbes v. Facebook, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19857, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2016) (Facebook is a private corporation whose
actions are not attributable to the state); Doe v. Cuomo, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 40899, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2013) (Facebook is not
a state actor under the joint action test); Young v. Facebook, Inc.,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116530, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2010)
(Facebook is not a state actor); see also Green v. Am. Online (AOL),
318 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 2003) (AOL is not a state actor); AbuJamal v. Nat'l Pub. Radio, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13604, at *4
(D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1997) (NPR is not a state actor).
123
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Gulf retained over the company-owned municipality of
Chickasaw.124 Although the Court in Marsh may have rested
its decision at least in part on the fact that the town square
was open to the public and immediately accessible from the
nearby highway, those facts alone are insufficient in the
digital age to hold Big Tech accountable for censoring
speech.125 The Court has made it clear that “a private entity
may qualify as a state actor [only] when it exercises ‘powers
traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.”

126

Aside

from “running elections and operating a company town,” not
much else qualifies.

127

Certainly, “[p]roviding some kind of

forum for speech is not an activity that only governmental
entities have traditionally performed.”128
Prager University, an organization with the mission
to “provide conservative viewpoints and perspective on
public issues,”129 challenged YouTube in 2020 However, the
Court dismissed the case due largely to its inability to bridge

Marsh, supra note 24.
Id.
126 Halleck, supra note 121, at 1940 (quoting Jackson, supra note
17, at 352).
127 Id. at 1929.
128 Halleck, supra note 121, at 1930.
129 Prager Univ., supra note 107, at 995.
124
125
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the gap between YouTube, a private entity, and the
constraints of the First Amendment. 130 As a result, YouTube
tagged several dozen of Prager’s videos and classified them
as restricted, subjecting them to YouTube’s Restricted
Mode.131 YouTube’s Restricted Mode is a user-activated
feature designed to screen out potentially mature content the
user may not want to watch.132 It uses a combination of
signals, such

as “video title, description,

metadata,

Community Guidelines reviews, and age restrictions,” to
filter out content.133 Content typically subject to Restricted
Mode features drugs, alcohol, violence, and specific details
about war, terrorism, crime, and political conflict.134 In
addition, YouTube demonetized some of Prager’s videos,
meaning the company could not make money from
advertisements.135
Prager attempted to challenge YouTube because it
performs a public function,136 yet it failed to meet the

See id.
Id.
132 YOUTUBE HELP,
https://support.google.com/youtube/
answer/174084?hl=en&co=GENIE.Platform%3DDesktop
visited July 21, 2021).
133 Id.
134 Prager Univ., supra note 107, at 996.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 997.
130
131

(last
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demanding requirement of showing that the company is
conducting a traditionally exclusive government function.
The courts have made it clear that hosting speech on a
private platform is not an activity traditionally performed by
governmental entities.137 Further, the court held that
“YouTube does not perform a public function by inviting
public discourse on its property.”138 Additionally, Prager
attempted to argue that YouTube had circumscribed its own
rights by opening it up to the public in general.139 The Court
declined to credit this argument as well, blatantly refusing
to apply the principles from Marsh and once again
distinguishing that holding as a “unique and rare context”
where a private actor was performing the full range of
municipal powers.140 Rather, operating a platform for usergenerated content is a far cry from exercising the full range
of municipal powers evidenced in Marsh.141 YouTube does

Prager Univ., supra note 107, at 999; Halleck, supra note 121,
at 1929.
138 Prager Univ., supra note 107.
139 Id. at 998-99.
140 Id. at 999.
141 Id.
137
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not even evidence any characteristic of any American
town.142

2. DIGITAL PLATFORMS ARE NOT PUBLIC FORUMS
Although the argument of “Big Tech as a public
forum” may initially appear to be appealing, it too is an
argument that ultimately fails. Indeed, the town square or
public street is the quintessential model in American
jurisprudence of the public forum.143 The courts have long
held that open spaces such as those where the public has
unconditional access have been used to communicate, share
ideas, and discuss relevant topics.144 And at least one opinion
seems to equate the realms of Facebook, Twitter, and
LinkedIn to these traditional public spaces.145 However, the
courts have routinely held the fact that Internet platforms
that are open to the public are not state actors by virtue of

Id.
See generally United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 742
(1990); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 45 (1983) (Streets and parks have long been public places for
assembly, discussing ideas, and communicating, the government
cannot prohibit all communications therein).
144 Id. (citing Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organizations,
307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.)).
145 See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S.Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017)
(holding that a state statute preventing a felon from accessing
social media altogether was equivalent to preventing the
individual from exercising his First Amendment rights).
142
143
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that fact alone.146 For a public forum to exist, it must be the
government that opens the property to public discourse, not
a private entity.147 Any attempt to label any Big Tech
platform as a public forum would, by definition, need to meet
the threshold inquiry of whether or not the government
opened the forum.148
Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v.
Trump questioned the boundaries of Big Tech’s ability to
censor and regulate material on its platforms.149 In that case,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court’s holding that comment threads (“the ‘interactive
space’ associated with each tweet”)150 on Twitter, a digital,

Id. at 997; See Belknap v. Alphabet, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 3d 1156
(D. Or. 2020) (Alphabet, Google, and YouTube are not state actors
simply because they created a public forum); Manhattan Cmty.
Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1934 (2019) (A private
entity is not a state actor merely because it provides a forum for
speech); See, e.g., Freedom Watch, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 368 F. Supp.
3d 30, 40 (D.D.C. 2019) (cert. denied) (Facebook and Twitter are
private businesses which are not transmuted into state actors
simply because they are open to public use); Howard v. Am. Online
Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 754 (9th Cir. 2000) (Providing Internet service
to the public without more did not make America Online (AOL) a
state actor).
147 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 802 (1985).
148 Id.
149 Knight First Amdt. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d
226 (2019).
150 Id. at 233.
146
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social media platform, were the equivalent of a public
forum.151 In reaching its holding, the court stated that “to
determine whether a public forum has been created . . . look
‘to the policy and practice of the government’ as well as ‘the
nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive
activity to discern the government’s intent.’” 152 Applying this
test, the Second Circuit court concluded that “opening an
instrumentality of communication ‘for indiscriminate use by
the general public’ creates a public forum.”153 Further,
neither temporary government control of property “[n]or [the
fact] that the government does not ‘own’ the property in the
sense that it holds title to the property, is . . . determinative
of whether the property” is sufficient for First Amendment
purposes.154 As a result, the court affirmed the District
Court’s holding that then-President Trump was unable to
regulate who could view and comment on his social media
posts without infringing upon their First Amendment
liberties.155

Id.
Id. at 226 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806).
153 Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,
460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)).
154 Id. at 235.
155 Id.
151
152

TRADITIONALLY EXCLUSIVE

211

On appeal, the Court vacated the Second Circuit
opinion.156 It then remanded with instructions to dismiss as
moot following the administration change, but not without
Justice Thomas authoring a concurring opinion.157 In that
opinion, Justice Thomas rightly pointed out that the Second
Circuit’s argument is in tension with the classic definition of
what constitutes a public decision.158 Despite President
Trump being a government official who often used Twitter to
speak in an official capacity, Twitter remains a private
company, not a government-controlled space.159 Although
President Trump could control other users’ ability to post on
the comment threads, his authority to regulate the forum
and control it was secondary to Twitter, who retained the
authority “to remove an account at any time for any
reason.”160 The fact that Twitter exercised that authority to
ban President Trump from the platform further evidenced
that whatever control President Trump retained as a

Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S.
Ct. 1220, 1221 (2021) (Thomas, J. concurring).
157 Id.
158 Id. at 1222.
159 Id.
160 Id.
156
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government official was only secondary to that of the private
entity.
Similarly, simply self-labeling as a public forum is
insufficient to create a public forum. Transmutation of
property into a public forum is not possible by the actions of
a private individual.161 The court in Prager declined to
classify YouTube as a public forum for this reason. Instead,
Prager asserted that YouTube’s self-representation as being
committed to freedom of expression and that a comment by
an executive before a congressional committee that the
platform was a “neutral public fora” was insufficient to
transmute the private property into a public forum.162

3. PRIVATE PROPERTY IS NOT TRANSFORMED BY
HOSTING SPEECH AND REGULATIONS ARE STILL
NOT ENOUGH
Problematic is the fact that courts continue to uphold
the traditional line of cases from Lloyd Corp. forward, which
holds that merely providing a venue for public speech does
not transmute the private party into a state actor.163 Private

Prager Univ., supra note 107 at 999.
Id.
163 Lloyd Corp., supra note 45, at 569.
161
162
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property owners have a long-standing history of opening up
their property to the public for speech, and the courts have
made it clear that an Internet Service Provider whose
network provided access to the Internet was not a
government actor.164 As a result, courts have consistently
denied that private digital companies that host usergenerated content on their platforms create state actors.165
Even in the digital realm, courts rejected the argument,
steadfastly maintaining that “[s]uch a rule would eviscerate
the state action doctrine’s distinction between government
and private entities because ‘all private property owners and
private lessees who open their property for speech would be
subject to First Amendment constraints.’”166

See, e.g., Howard, supra note 146, at 754 (providing Internet
service does not make AOL an instrument of the government);
Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 2003) (“AOL
is not transformed into a state actor because [it] provides a
connection to the Internet on which government and taxpayerfunded websites are found [or] because AOL opens its network to
the public whenever an AOL member accesses the Internet and
receives email or other messages from non-members of AOL); See
also Sanger v. Reno, 966 F. Supp. 151, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(providers are not state actors and are free to impose content-based
restrictions without implicating the First Amendment");
165 Belknap, supra note 146; Howard, supra note 146, at 754.
166 Prager Univ., supra note 107, at 997 (quoting Halleck, supra
note 121).
164
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Although Halleck was not a suit against Big Tech per

se, it is still instructive in this regard. The case involved a
claim against Time Warner’s cable system in Manhattan.167
The New York State Public Service Commission, which
regulates cable franchising, passed a state law that requires
cable systems to set aside channels for public access on a
free-of-use, first-come, first-served basis.168 Halleck coproduced a film critical of Manhattan Neighborhood
Network, which aired on its public access channels.169 The
network initially aired the program and then suspended
Halleck and his co-producer from all network services and
facilities.170 Halleck then brought suit, claiming that the
network had violated his First Amendment rights by
restricting access to the statutorily required public access
channels.171 Dismissing all of Halleck's claims, the Court
reiterated that “a private entity who provides a forum for
speech is not transformed by that fact alone into a state
actor.”172 If so, then those property owners “would lose the

Halleck, supra note 21, at 1926.
Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 1930.
167
168
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ability to exercise what they deem to be appropriate editorial
discretion within that open forum.”173 Further, such a courtmade law would completely disregard private property
interests in America.174
The Court in Halleck also upheld the traditional
limitation that “the fact that the government licenses,
contracts with, or grants a monopoly to a private entity does
not convert the private entity into a state actor—unless the
private entity is performing a traditional, exclusive public
function.”175 Once again, the Court forewarned that such a
holding would transform virtually every private entity
regulated by a government statute or regulation into a state
actor, subjecting their activities to the multitude of
constitutional restraints.176

IV. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION IS THE SOLUTION
Unfortunately, there is no quick-and-ready solution.
At its core, the state action doctrine imputes constitutional
limitations on private actors or entities under certain

Id. at 1931.
Id.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 1932.
173
174
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conditions such that individual liberties are not unduly
burdened or outright extinguished. Although it is far from
defunct, the doctrine is a mediocre bandage to potential
claims at best that the Court has shown no interest in
revitalizing or expanding. Although there may be as-of-yet
unexplored judicial remedies, the soundest solution is for
Congress to invoke its legislative authority and provide for a
remedy. In particular, this paper contends that the best way
for it to do so is in the form of enacting legislation providing
for either (1) the delegation of authority to an administrative
agency along with the instruction to create an administrative
body to promulgate rules governing censorship within the
Big

Tech

arena,

review

alleged

infringements,

and

commence enforcement actions against violators or (2) the
creation of a statutory cause of action which would allow
individuals to challenge perceived violations in court. In
either event, the revival and adaptation of the fairness
doctrine can provide the basis for a standard to which these
entities should be held accountable.

A. THE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY
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Administrative agencies are entities within the
executive branch of the government tasked with creating
rules and regulations at the behest of Congressional
direction.177 Agencies are each governed by their respective
enabling statutes, which outline the agency’s realm of
authority per congressional intent and have two means of
effectuating their statutory purpose: rulemaking and
adjudication.178 The Congressional delegation of authority to
an administrative agency would provide for several different
mechanisms to check against Big Tech action and
unwarranted censorship. First, agencies are expected to
possess the requisite expertise regarding the areas of the law
entrusted to them under the congressional delegation of
authority; they possess the ability to create and effectuate
the best rules and regulations.179 Second, administrative
regulation would provide an avenue for both private
individuals and entities to challenge perceived violations of

Jason Gordon, Administrative Agencies – Explained, THE
BUSINESS PROFESSOR (Sept. 23, 2021),
https://thebusinessprofessor.com/en_US/us-legal-system/whatare-administrative-agencies.
178 Id.
179 Chevron, infra note 182.
177
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any rules the agency promulgates. Third, the agency would
possess the innate authority to commence adjudicatory
action against and sanction Big Tech companies that fail to
comply with regulation.
Administrative agencies are generally recognized as
experts in their respective fields, a fact exemplified by the
high level of judicial deference given to them by courts.180
Indeed, the Court’s general philosophy when reviewing cases
arising out of administrative rulemaking or adjudication
tends to be a high level of deference predicated solely upon
this expertise.181 The result is the Court’s recognition that
“[j]udges are not experts in the field”182 and that Congress
delegates authority to administrative agencies “thinking
that

those

with

great

expertise

and

charged

with

responsibility for administering the provision would be in a
better position to do so [than the courts].”183 This framework
has created a series of entities within the federal

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
415 (1971) ("The APA accords the agency a presumption that it has
acted in accordance with the law.").
181 Jason Metha, The Development of Federal Professional
Responsibility Rules: The Effect of Institutional Choice on Rule
Outcomes, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 57, 86 (2007).
182 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
183 Id.
180
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government's executive branch that can create and enforce
regulatory rules within specific realms of authority.184
The

procedures

and

requirements

for

both

rulemakings, the administrative equivalent of legislative
action, and adjudication, the administrative equivalent of
judicial procedures, are governed by the Administrate
Procedures Act (“APA”).185 Additionally, the APA also creates
and prescribes the standards for judicial review of agency
action.186

The

rulemaking

function

of administrative

agencies is a quasi-legislative function and the means by
which agencies administer rules.187 According to the APA,
rulemaking procedures can be formal or informal.188 Formal
rulemaking is a trial-like procedure governed by Sections
556189 and 557190 of the APA and is rarely used. However, it
is arguably the best means of satisfying Due Process

Id.
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 550 et seq. (1946).
186 5 U.S.C.S. § 556 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 117-80).
187 Chevron, supra note 182, at 843.
188 Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 550 et seq. (1946); see
also, Int’l Council of Shopping Ctrs. v. Oregon Env’t Quality
Comm’n, 556 P2d 138, 140 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (“[T]he federal
Administrative Procedures Act provides for two types of agency
rulemaking.).
189 5 U.S.C.S. § 556 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 117-80).
190 5 U.S.C.S. § 557 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 117-80).
184
185
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concerns

and

creating

the

fairest,

most

accurate,

representative, and (arguably) effective rules. Informal
rulemaking,

also

known

as

Notice

and

Comment

rulemaking, is governed by Section 553 of the APA and is by
far the more common of the two.191
Notice and Comment procedures are designed “to
facilitate the informed and reasoned decision making of
governmental agencies”192 and “reflect Congress’s ‘judgment
that informed administrative decision making require[s]
that agency decisions be made only after affording interested
persons an opportunity to communicate their views to the
agency.”193 Indeed, the notice and comment procedures are
thought to “assure the legitimacy of administrative
norms,”194 and one of its fundamental benefits is to increase
and allow for “public participation and fairness [from and] to
affected parties[.]”195 As a result, the informal rulemaking

Int’l Council of Shopping Ctrs., supra, note 188, at 140 (“The
more common type [of rulemaking] is called "informal" or "noticeand-comment" rulemaking [whereas] [t]he other federal
rulemaking procedure is called "formal" rulemaking."
192 Comm. for Fairness v. Kemp, 791 F. Supp. 888, 896 (D.D.C.
1992).
193 Air Transp. Ass’n v. Department of Transp. 900 F.2d 369, 375
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,
316, (1979)).
194 Id.
195 Am. Hosp. Asso. v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
191
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process is perhaps one of the best ways to gather views for
all interested parties and form the fairest and most
appropriate rules.
Under notice and comment rulemaking, an agency
will provide notice of any proposed rule or proposed changes
to a rule to the public via publication in the Federal Register
and then receive comments from interested persons for a set
period of time.196 The initial publication in the Federal
Register almost always explains what the agency is trying to
accomplish with the proposed rulemaking, what prompted
the rulemaking, the various contents and provisions of the
proposed rule, reference to the legal authority under which
the rule is promulgated,197 and any other information that
might be deemed pertinent by the agency. Interested parties
are then permitted to comment on the pending rules,
affording them the opportunity to participate in the process
by bringing potentially problematic concerns to the agency’s
attention

and

lobbying

for

beneficial

changes.198

5 U.S.C.S. § 553(b) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 117-80).
5 U.S.C.S. § 553(b)(2) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 117-80).
198 Contacting Elected Officials: Comment on Pending Regulations,
BERKLEY LIBRARY,
196
197
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Additionally, the notice and comment period provides a level
of transparency that may not be available in other forms of
rulemaking.199 Finally, this period has the effect of reducing
antagonization to the final rule from governed entities,200
making the rule easier to enforce, and decreasing the cost of
enforcement after the rule goes into effect.201
Adjudication under the APA is the agency process for
issuing an order and is roughly an issuance of final agency
action

in

any

other

matter

except

rulemaking.202

Adjudication is the administrative equivalent for judicial
action, and as such, is typically directed toward a single or
select few individuals and predicated upon facts unique to
only those individuals. Like rulemaking, the APA states that
adjudication procedures can be either formal or informal,

https://guides.lib.berkeley.edu/ContactingOfficials/regs (last
visited Jan. 28, 2022).
199 Stephen M. Johnson; #BetterRules: The Appropriate Use of
Social Media in Rulemaking, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1379, 1385
(2017); Michael Herz, Using Social Media in Rulemaking:
Possibilities and Barriers, 1, 6 (Nov. 21, 2013)
[https://perma.cc/FP83-BDNW].
200 Id.; See also Herz, supra note 199, at 6.
201 Id.; See also Herz, supra note 199, at 6.
202 5 U.S.C.S. § 551(6) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 117-80) (“‘order’
means the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether
affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an
agency in a matter other than rule making but including
licensing”).
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although the latter is once again the more common of the
two. Because adjudication is fundamentally a quasi-judicial
enforcement action often initiated by the agency, the agency
retains wide latitude and discretion in whom it chooses to
prosecute. This ability gives the agency the power to tackle
the worst offenders and choose the specific facts and
circumstances on a case-by-case basis to broadcast its
decision to enforce the rules to other potential offenders.
Although this prevents enforcement on a widespread level
since the terms of the adjudication only apply to the specific
parties, it provides a strong signal to others in the respective
industry and functions as a form of constructive notice as to
what will be tolerated and what will not. Even the mere
threat of adjudication or enforcement can have a coercive
effect.

B. THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
1. BRIEF HISTORY AND OVERVIEW
Almost all forms of media, both broadcasts and print,
are protected within the boundaries of the First Amendment
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by its free speech guarantees.203 Broadcasts in particular
have been the subject of extensive government regulation for
almost an entire century.204 As early as the 1920s, the United
States

Supreme

Court

recognized

that

“[w]ithout

government control, the medium [of radio] would be of little
use because of the cacophony of competing voices, none of
which could be clearly and predictably heard.”205 The result
was

the

creation

of

the

Federal

Communications

Commission (“FCC”) in 1934,206 which gained the ability to
regulate radio broadcasting in the public interest. 207 The
public interest was “[v]ery shortly thereafter [interpreted to
require] ample play for the free and fair competition of
opposing views” and applied “to all discussions of issues of
importance to the public.”208 Thus, at their core, both the

See Red Lion Broad. Co. Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union v. Parsons, 172 W. Va.
386, 396 (W. Va. 1983) (citing United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948)).
205 Red Lion Broad. Co. Inc. supra note 203, at 376.
206 Federal Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No 73-416, 48
Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151-757).
207 Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) (“The
touchstone provided by Congress was the public interest,
convenience, or necessity, a criterion which is as concrete as the
complicated factors for judgment in such a field of delegated
authority permit (quoting Federal Commc’n Comm’n v. Pottsville
Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940))).
208 Red Lion Broad. Co., supra note 203, at 377 (internal citations
omitted).
203
204
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FCC and its predecessor, the Federal Radio Commission,
shared the same goal of achieving fairness.
The fairness doctrine arose out of this public interest
and its fundamental purpose was predicated upon the
public’s fundamental right to be informed.209 As a result, the
effect of the fairness doctrine was to impose two
requirements on broadcast coverages regarding any topic
concerning public importance.210 First, the broadcaster was
required to give an issue of public concern adequate
coverage, and second, it must accurately reflect different
points of view.211 Both prongs of this requirement reflected
the precept that the public interest has a right to the free
flow of information and access to opposing points of view.212
One of the key facets of the fairness doctrine was the
enforcement of how broadcasting networks applied it.213
After Red Lion, there was a “constitutional obligation to
provide an opportunity for the presentation of contrasting

United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, supra note 204, at 397.
Id.
211 Red Lion Broad. Co., supra note 203, at 377.
212 Id.
213 United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, supra note 204, at 402.
209
210
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views on the controversial issues of public importance,”214
which was triggered whenever only a single side of any
controversial public issue was presented. 215 Important as
well is that “while no particular individual has a guaranteed
right of access to the broadcast microphone for his own selfexpression, the public as a whole does retain its paramount
right to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experiences.”216
Thus, networks were given “considerable discretion in
selecting

the

spokesman,

manner

and

the

of

coverage,

techniques

of

the

appropriate

production

and

presentation.”217 Invariably, this wide range of discretion
meant that there was an ever-evolving and ever-changing
methodology being applied by networks and press entities in
order to meet the requirements imposed by the fairness
doctrine. Moreover, there was no set formula proscribed for
broadcasts to follow in order to ensure fairness, which
created a grey area of uncertainty for broadcast companies.
While they were able to develop remedies to comply with the
Id.
See Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
216 United Mine Workers, supra note 213, at 402 (internal citations
omitted).
217 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 16 (June 27, 1974).
214
215
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doctrine’s requirements on a case-by-case basis, this also
meant that they might not always be certain of compliance
with the rule. As a result, the courts tended to look at
whether broadcast entities had to make “a diligent, goodfaith effort to communicate to [proponents of an opposing
view their] willingness to present their views.” 218 And in
doing so, the entity was required to provide a sufficient
amount of time to the alternative point of view such that it
presented a “reasonably balanced presentation.”219

2. PAST CRITICISMS
The second prong of the fairness doctrine fairly received
criticism that it stifled speech and abridged an individual’s
First Amendment rights rather than empowered them.220 At
its basis, the doctrine was essentially a requirement imposed
by the government, which mandated that a broadcaster or
network convey speech that did not endorse and which it may
have

believed

contained

potentially

dangerous

Id. at 14.
United Mine Workers, supra note 204, at 403 (internal citations
omitted).
220 R. Trevor Hale & James C. Phillips, Article: The Fairness
Doctrine in Light of Hostile Media Perception, 19 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 395, 400-05 (2011).
218
219
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consequences.221 Rather than risk violating the law and
facing judicial consequences, the recourse for many entities
may have been simply that broadcasters and news sources
chose to forgo reporting on specific issues and “avoid
controversy”222 rather than risk the fines associated with
inadequate coverage.223 When this happens, the consequence
then is that “political and electoral coverage would be
blunted or reduced.”224 Obviously, such a result would run
contrary to the doctrine’s purpose to keep the public
informed.
In addition, the origins of the doctrine trace back to the
1920s when radio was viewed as a form of entertainment and
not necessarily a part of the press or news-media world.225 In
that era, access to the spectrum capable of hosting
electromagnetic

airwaves

was

viewed

as

a

limited

Id.
Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974) (discussing the effects of a
Florida statute which statute that granted a political candidate a
right to equal space to answer criticism and attacks on his record
by a newspaper and which also made it a misdemeanor for the
newspaper to fail to comply).
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Hale & Phillips, supra note 221, at 406.
221
222
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commodity requiring regulation.226 Indeed, this “scarcity
argument” was alive and well in the late 1960s when the
Court recognized the fairness doctrine as constitutionally
valid in Red Lion Broadcasting Co.227

3. REMEDY
Congressional delegation placing the responsibility
for crafting the rules and regulations within the hands of an
administrative agency would constitute a crucial first step
toward solving the issue of Big Tech companies abridging
individuals’ fundamental liberties. An agency is in the best
position to craft the rules necessary to effectively govern the
digital world due to its expertise and ability to gather
pertinent

information

through

notice

and

comment

rulemaking. Further, an agency’s ability to adjudicate claims
against the giants would serve as an enforcement
mechanism capable of enforcing its rules. Private individuals
or entities would be able to seek rulemaking, and it would

Id.; See Red Lion Broad, Co. supra note 178, at 390 (“Because of
the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to
put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be
expressed on this unique medium.”).
227 Id.
226
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provide an avenue through which individuals could file
grievances when they feel their rights have been violated.
The FCC, for example, was able to exercise some level
of regulatory authority over the Internet (especially over
Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”)) until 2010 when the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that it was unable to exercise
ancillary jurisdiction over ISPs.228 In its mandate, the
Communications Act of 1934 grants broad authority to the
FCC to regulate “interstate and foreign commerce in
communication by wire and radio so as to make available . .
. to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient,
Nation-wide, and worldwide wire and radio communication
service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges.”229
The FCC has generally recognized this to be a wide grant of
authority, and the courts have supposed the contention,
although it is not limitless. Over the past century, the FCC
has

grown

beyond

“the

dissemination

of

radio

Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C.C. April 6, 2010)
(Holding that the FCC could not regulate Internet Service
Providers under Title II powers granted to it by the enabling act
because the FCC classified Internet Service Providers as
information services governed by Title 1 of the Communications
Act of 1934 and not common carriers as governed by Title II of the
Act,).
229 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1996).
228
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communications intended to be received by the public,
directly or by the intermediary of relay stations,” 230 and the
now-expanded definition also includes a wide variety of
broadcast stations, including television, satellite, wire, and
cable.231
Although a blanket rule constituting an application of
First Amendment freedoms to social media platforms would
be a massive first step in the right direction, a revival and
adaptation of the fairness doctrine would better serve the
goal of protecting speech on digital platforms. Although
almost all forms of speech are protected to varying degrees,
the primary interest in today’s age is the unwarranted
suppression of speech the media giants do not agree with—
particularly speech revolving around political ideologies. The
fairness doctrine, at its core, is specifically designed to
protect these types of speech by guaranteeing equal
treatment to opposing points of view so long as it is within
the public interest. While the concept of what constitutes the

47 U.S.C. § 153(7) (2010).
What We Do, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/what-wedo#:~:text=The%20Federal%20Communications%20Commission
%20regulates,of%20Columbia%20and%20U.S.%20territories (last
visited July 31, 2021).
230
231
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public interest is debatable, it is undeniable that didactically
opposed, liberal and conservative ideologies seeking to foster
discussion and disseminate information and political beliefs
would fall within this realm.
Past criticisms of the fairness doctrine carry
substantial weight, yet their application to the digital arena
arguably lessons such concerns that were derived from an
era relegated to radio and visual broadcast. Rather than
encouraging a broadcaster or news reporter to seek out a
speaker from an opposing point of view and affording them
equal airtime on what may be a limited broadcast, Big Tech
would merely be required to allow opposing messages to exist
within the same space. Under a modern application of the
fairness doctrine, the company would simply be prohibited
from actively seeking to censor one type of speech while
allowing another to proliferate or actively promoting one
while simply permitting another to exist behind a digital
dead zone.
In a digital, algorithm-driven world, a modern
application of the fairness doctrine would also mean that
companies could not use algorithms to achieve the same
effect. Google, for example, would not be permitted to use

TRADITIONALLY EXCLUSIVE

233

algorithms to actively bury conservative-leaning search
results, passively pushing articles supporting an opposing
point of view to the forefront. Likewise, companies such as
Facebook would not be permitted to use algorithms to
promote advertisements or other content supporting one
political agenda or censor messages supporting one type of
political ideology. Platforms such as YouTube would be
unable to use algorithms to push favored videos to the
detriment of another. Under a modern application of the
fairness doctrine, these companies would be able to support
one type of content only if it gives equal treatment to an
opposing point of view. There’s no reason for any platform to
forgo hosting content supporting a certain ideology so long as
it also allows equal access to another.

C. THE ALTERNATIVE – A STATUTORY RIGHT OF
ACTION
In addition to administrative enforcement, Congress
also holds the ability to create a private right of action that
would permit individuals or entities to bring the suit directly
in court. The most analogous example of this is perhaps the
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Fair Debt Collections Practice Act (“FDCPA”). 232 Created as
part of Title VIII in 1977, the FDCPA was enacted
specifically because “existing laws and procedures for
redressing injuries”233 were inadequate and because there
was “abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and
unfair

.

.

.

practices.”234

The

FDCPA

creates

an

administrative remedy in that it enables the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) and the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) 235 to enforce its provisions, but in
addition, the Act also creates a private right of action that
provides citizens with the ability to sue directly in court.236
While the Act specifically prohibits several practices and
types of conduct that a debt collector may not engage in,
broadly

prohibiting

any

“conduct

[whose]

natural

consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any
person,”237 enumerates numerous unfair practices238 and
false or misleading representations,239 and there also is a

Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et. seq.
(1977).
233 15 U.S.C. § 1692(b) (1977).
234 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (1977).
235 15 U.S.C. § 1692(l) (2010).
236 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k) (2010).
237 15 U.S.C. § 1692(d) (1977).
238 15 U.S.C. § 1692(f) (1977).
239 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (1996).
232
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plethora of case law that has developed within the various
circuits interpreting these provisions. Most pertinent,
however, the FDCPA enables a person who recovers against
a debt collector who fails to comply with the FDCPA actual
damages, additional damages up to a statutory cap, enables
class action lawsuits, and allows for the recovery of
attorney’s fees in the case of a successful suit.240
Creating a statutory right of action would provide
individuals direct access to the courts and has the potential
to be a powerful tool in protecting an individual’s rights
against Big Tech’s infringement. The primary concern over
the creation of such a right of action would be flooding the
courts with potentially unwarranted or frivolous claims, yet
the pleading process is designed to act as a gatekeeper to the
courts. Additionally, some courts have added a requirement
to similar state laws that a potential plaintiff establish, as a
precondition to any private action, that the aggrieved action
was against the public interest, caused public injury, or

240

15 U.S.C. § 1692(k) (2010).
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affected consumers in general.241 Preconditions such as these
have a preclusive effect and help ensure that only
meritorious claims make it onto the courts’ dockets.

V. CONCLUSION
As attempts to restrain the reach and oversight of Big
Tech continue, cases are almost certain to attempt using the
state action doctrine as a means of transmuting these
company’s actions into state action. As demonstrated above,
however, the hurdles imposed by the doctrine are difficult, if
not outright impossible, to overcome. In the absence of
express congressional legislation or the Court overturning
half a century’s worth of jurisprudence, the applicability of
the doctrine within the digital realm is virtually nonexistent.

Zeeman v. Black, 273 S.E.2d 910 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)
(interpreting Ga. Code Ann. §§ 106-1210, 106-1203(a) and holding
that a private suit could be brought under the Fair Business
Practices Act only for protection of the public); Tracker Marine,
L.P. v. Ogle, 108 S.W.3d 349, 352-3 (Tex. App. 2003) (Comparing
laws within the other states, the court observed that “Nebraska
and New York require [a] public interest impact at before allowing
private actions [and] Nevada allows private actions only by the
elderly or disabled”); McTeer v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins., 712 F.
Supp. 512, 514 (D.S.C. 1989) (interpreting South Carolina Law
S.SC. Code Ann. § 39-5-140(a) and holding that a transaction must
affect the public interest); Lightfoot v. MacDonald, 544 P.2d 88, 90
(Wash. 1976) (interpreting Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.090 and
holding that “A breach of a private contract affecting no one but
the parties to the contract . . . is not an act or practice affecting the
public interest”).
241
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Aside from assuming the full range of municipal
powers as demonstrated by the unique circumstances in
Marsh, discriminatory tampering with the election process,
or maintaining public property such as parks, the Court has
only expressed one other traditionally exclusive government
function, which is the power of eminent domain. 242 At the end
of the day, nothing is going to be a traditionally exclusive
government function. Arguably, even the performance of war
has been contracted out to soldiers-for-hire and mercenary
groups. The result is that the public functions test is
virtually guaranteed to be nonapplicable to any digital
application. The entwinement doctrine may offer a glimmer
of hope as the current administration seeks to encourage
social media giants such as Facebook to stop the flow of
misinformation, particularly surrounding the vaccine,243 but
the level of involvement from the executive branch necessary
to reach the symbiotic relationship required seems unlikely.

Jackson, supra note 17 at 353.
Biden Calls on Facebook to Stop Spread Of ‘Outrageous
Misinformation’ About Covid Vaccines, YAHOO ENTERTAINMENT
(July 19, 2021), https://www.yahoo.com/entertainment/biden-callsfacebook-stop-spread-165242183.html.
242
243
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As it stands, Big Tech and the companies’ Internet

actions are regulated by Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act.244 The act is designed specifically to provide
immunity for providers who host content, such that they are
not liable for the content itself.245 In combination with the
inability to impose the requirements of fundamental civil
liberties, these companies enjoy a large shield of immunity
from many civil actions. Although there is no promising,
forthcoming solution, the Court has at least recognized the
problem. Justice Thomas warned:
Today’s digital platforms provide avenues for
historically unprecedented amounts of speech,
including speech by government actors. Also
unprecedented, however, is the concentrated
control of so much speech in the hands of a few
private parties. We will soon have no choice
but to address how our legal doctrines apply to
highly
concentrated,
privately
owned
information infrastructure such as digital
platforms.246

Lauren Feiner, Big Tech’s Favorite Law is Under Fire, CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/19/what-is-section-230-and-whydo-some-people-want-to-change-it.html (updated Feb. 19, 2020,
9:22 AM EST).
245 Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2021) (“No
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.”).
246 Biden Calls on Facebook to Stop Spread Of ‘outrageous
misinformation’ about Covid Vaccines, supra note 140, at 1221.
244
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Justice Thomas’s suggested solution was a closer look
at the doctrines surrounding common carriers and public
accommodations, two legal doctrines that limit a company’s
right to exclude, which are still very much intact and
relevant to the issues at hand. Until the Court creates
another avenue for approaching the issue or Congress passes
legislation, however, the state action doctrine is not the key
to successfully limiting Big Tech.

